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Research Highlights and Abstract
This article:
• Problematizes the concept of ‘home’ and ‘hospitality’ in the case of unfinished states
in terms of sovereignty;
• Argues that the concept of home is always preconditioned by the differences of host
and guest; in cases where these two are intermingled/confused/unclear, the concept
of home changes too;
• Looks at local and international narratives on Kosovo as a struggle of conceptual
ownerships;
• Asserts that international and local narratives are always already both subject and
object, yet fully neither at the same time, they exist and are destroyed by their own,
and their subjectivity therefore lies in their autoimmunity, which makes them
intrinsically undecidable;
• States that the Serbs and the Albanians have reached a historical point on their claim
on Kosovo, where they share Kosovo as a state beyond ‘home’ (beyond sovereignty);
for the Serbs, Kosovo as their previous ‘home’ is beyond remedy, for the Albanians
Kosovo as their new/legitimate ‘home’ is beyond reach.
This article examines local narratives on Kosovo and their role in crafting and articulating
interpretations of Kosovo and international missions. Using the concept of ‘home’, as used and
conceptualised by Jacques Derrida, the article reverses the order of who is ‘guest’ and ‘host’ in
Kosovo and how that defines the local narratives on the subject. In the first part, attention is paid
solely to letting local narratives deconstruct themselves, while in the second part we let them
deconstruct the international narrative on Kosovo. The aim of the article is to present Kosovo as a
battleground of division and commonality among the narratives and at the same time as an
‘impossible’ ‘home’ of all its narratives. In conclusion, some thoughts pave the way for the idea of
‘renegotiating’ the concept of ‘home’ with particular focus on ‘home’ in interventions and missions
and its ultimate influence on the ethics of intervention.
Keywords: hospitality; Derrida; Kosovo; EU
Introduction
This article looks at the competing/different narratives on Kosovo—narratives of its
local population—in relation to the international narratives on Kosovo. During the
author’s field work in Kosovo, it was revealed that there is something essential in
the local narratives themselves that needs to be unravelled. Throughout the inter-
view process, it became clear that something was happening at the subterranean
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level, something that not many people were paying much attention to: a dissatis-
faction accumulating among the people. In the cacophony of grand projects for
Kosovo—to bring it closer to ‘euro-Atlantic structures’; to make it a model country
of rule of law and democracy; to bring it closer to European standards and values—
the article reverses the focus by bringing the local narrative to the centre and pushes
aside, for a moment, Kosovo as a democratising project.
Since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo has been recog-
nised by more than 100 states. While Serbia maintains its staunch opposition to its
independence, Kosovo’s status remains contested at the international level, as it is
not yet a member of the United Nations. The European Union has not recognised
Kosovo’s independence ‘en bloc’ either, and has come up with the definition of
‘status neutral’, leaving it up to its member states to decide on their own relations
with Kosovo. This superfluid state of matter (in terms of status identification) has
its implications at the local level, as groups/ethnicities claim/contest/oppose their
right to claim Kosovo as their own. Broadly, at the international political level, the
international intervention is seeking to ‘test’ the creation of the very first post-
Westphalian/post-modern political entity bypassing the issue of status settlement.
At the local political level however, the discourse has remained anchored along the
lines of ‘finishing’ the state—in Westphalian terms. The local people in Kosovo
assert the necessity of belonging to a country/state which they own. These aspira-
tions do not only speak to the very idea of having an independent state; yet, they
are quintessentially linked to the very concept of belonging to the subject of
identification and ultimately being recognised (in terms of subjectivity) in the
international arena which is composed of sovereign states. Importantly, this
conceptualisation talks to dimensions of ethos and justice and as such when we speak
of Kosovo as a structure/state/belonging, we refer to it as ‘home’, which in political
science jargon would be equated with ‘state’: Kosovo as the home of its people.
In his work titled ‘Metabosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War’, Derridean scholar
David Campbell focuses on narrativizing strategies of objectivist works dealing with
the Bosnian War, highlighting issues of both interpretation and representation. He
suggests that a concern with the narratives can be important when it comes to
making judgments about competing accounts of contentious events and issues
(Campbell, 1998a, 267). Evidencing the competing narratives on Kosovo as home,
as belonging, from its local and international ‘stakeholders’, this article takes Camp-
bell’s conceptualisation of ‘Metabosnia’ and uses it to grasp and articulate the
narratives on Kosovo, what Kosovo means for each narrative, and how each
narrative claims ownership in its own story and ultimately claims ownership of
Kosovo as a structure, as a state, and as a project. Thus, the main aim of this article
is to look at the local and international narratives in a competing battleground,
unravel their underlying meanings and dimensions and ultimately claim that for
‘unfinished’ societies, the concept of being host of their home—to finalise the
project of statehood—remains strong, notwithstanding the trends of post-national/
post-Westphalian debates on states.
We embark by reversing binary oppositions of local narratives constructed from
interviews, a literature review and the author’s capability to synthesise these data.
In reversing the binary oppositions with deconstruction, we align with what
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Derrida calls the marginal, or the oppressed. Because of the high degree of inter-
national intervention and presence of missions, both in their structural and
conceptual form, Kosovo has many more of the characteristics of a protectorate/
semi-protectorate than those of a state. This has led to a situation in which the roles
of the ‘host’ (the missioniser) and the ‘guest’ (the local) have been reversed. The
missioniser has become the ‘host’ in that it decides, makes decisions and acts on
behalf of Kosovo as ‘home’ and on the other hand, the local has become the ‘guest’
playing along the rules set by what was initially the ‘guest’. In this new set-up, we
focus on the local narratives and let them deconstruct the international presence
and mission in Kosovo. In doing this, we first ‘return’ the locals to their original
position—that of ‘host’—and acknowledge Kosovo as their ‘home’. At the same
time, we place the missioniser in the position of the ‘guest’. In the second step, we
deconstruct the ‘international narrative’ through the stories of the locals and finally
let the two deconstruct themselves.
We maintain that this ‘reversal’ is important, first of all, to transfer focus to local
narratives in understanding how Kosovo is conceptualised using Derrida’s concept
of ‘home’. Second, the conflict in Kosovo, along with other developments that led
to Yugoslavia’s breakup, is largely (and not always rightly) explained as a result of
inter-ethnic hatred. This has produced what Edkins has referred to as ‘grand
narratives’ which according to her conceal the fragility of possible ‘solutions’
(Edkins 2013, 12). Being all-encompassing, the grand narratives are linear and as
such they offer an oversimplified ‘cause’ of the problem in question and ultimately
another oversimplified ‘solution’ to how to deal with it. In her narrative account,
Edkins calls for ‘troubling’ these linear narratives which according to her leave out
questions such as trauma, violence, testimony and forgiveness, and how these are
perhaps inevitably concealed in searches for causes and solutions:
Searches for solutions assume they know what the ‘problem’ is and focus
on the need to solve it, not to engage with the results or implications of
what is happening or has happened. They ignore the way in which it is
often difficult even to describe fully or coherently what has in fact hap-
pened, let alone subsume it under a label (Edkins 2003, 44).
This article first begins to ‘trouble’ the linear narrative constructed on Kosovo. In
other words, we reverse the pre-established concept of the conflict and argue that,
like in any other conflict/war, the events of 1999 in Kosovo were a struggle for
domination and power. Paraphrasing Clinton’s famous motto: ‘No, it’s not the old
myths and ethnic hatred. It’s the political power struggle, stupid’ (Žižek and Hamza
2013, 38). According to the same logic, we go beyond the dichotomous view and
look at narratives of other ethnic groups as well. The aim is to renegotiate the way
narratives on Kosovo are presented—as an ‘either/or’ equation between the Serbs
and the Albanians and the international actors as the non-aligned, objective actor
who seeks to do something in Kosovo beyond petty ethnic politics. Instead, we look
at the narratives of the local ethnic groups in Kosovo and the narratives of the
international structures in a horizontal scheme and look at them as struggles
between stories.
Derrida uses ‘home’ as a concept when he talks about the notion of hospitality. It
refers to ‘home’ on a personal level—how people welcome each other—but it also
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refers to states as ‘home’—how we welcome foreigners, migrants etc. (Derrida, 2000,
104). For Derrida, ‘home’ is the precondition for hospitality and defines it as ‘insofar
as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home is the familiar place
of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we
relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners’ (Derrida
2000, 197). Bulley goes further in arguing that ‘the unconditional desire for the
home, which is impossible to renounce also “should not be renounced”, for without
the home, “there is no door nor any hospitality” ’ (Bulley 2010, 57). The concept of
‘home’ would not have any meaning without ‘host’ and ‘guest’. A home may
not have a ‘guest’, maybe, but it certainly has a ‘host’. Even when we talk about
religious sites, we tend to say they are ‘homes’ of God, in that we attribute them to
a subject.
Kosovo’s Narratives
Narrative research is widely used in interpretivist social science. A number of
researchers have been using narratives—stories—to give voice to otherwise
marginalised discourses and/or groups (Shenhav 2004, 19; Stern, 2005, 166; Selbin
2010, 67; Edkins 2013, 34). Patterson and Monroe (1998, 113) argue that all
narratives are essentially normative, no matter how hidden the voice of the nar-
rator. To better contextualise Kosovo’s local narratives, it is interesting to look at
authors who have engaged with narratives of nations and nationalism and those who
have looked at narrative in war/conflicts. Shenhav’s interpretivist work on the
concept of ‘nation’ in the discourse of the Israeli Likud party looks at narrative as
a ‘struggle’ the nation has to go through—bloodshed, suffering, mourning, pain
(Shenhav 2004, 15). Due to the ‘securitisation’1 of Israel, because of the on-going
conflict with the Palestinians, Shenhav observes that the speech of narratives
‘constructs a collective speaker who addresses the nation with the goal of defending
the next generation’ (Shenhav 2004, 87).
Our aim is not to identify or proclaim which narratives are dominant or marginal;
rather, we approach them as a struggle between stories. Kosovo is a project of a
number of ‘stakeholders’ and as such has a number of narratives. In an immediate
categorisation, two groups of narratives are visible: narratives of locals and narratives
of internationals. The first, narratives of locals, can be ‘named’ Kosovo as historical justice,
a phrase which in this article denotes the stories of its peoples, ethnic/cultural
groups and explains Kosovo as the memory, identity and future of its own popu-
lation. The second is the Kosovo project or international narrative. This distinction
between ‘historical justice’ and ‘project’ aims to mark the very different approaches
the ‘guest’ and the ‘host’ maintain towards Kosovo as ‘home’. Kosovo project explains
Kosovo as a success story of the interveners, to indicate: 1) the merits of NATO’s
first attack on a sovereign land as ‘humanitarian intervention’; 2) as a success story
of conflict management and peace building under the most ambitious UN mission
in history (King and Mason 2007, 43); 3) as a triumph of Western democratic values
in a post-conflict/post-socialist setting; and 4) as a site of ‘European values’ and
‘best European practices’, unfolded via the EU presence in Kosovo and the largest
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission deployed to date, EULEX.
Synthesised, this narrative looks at the Kosovo project as a canvas for the projection
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of Western values (Richmond 2008, 41). Neither of these are compact narratives.
On the contrary, they are constantly deconstructed in their inner struggles. In this
part of the article, it is essential to note that in terms of ‘job description’, mandate,
aims and performance, there is a clear difference between the different interna-
tional actors of the Kosovo project (i.e. NATO, the US, the UN, KFOR, EU, EULEX
etc.). The interviewees were well acquainted with these differences. However,
when talking about themselves (themselves as locals) as subject of intervention and
missions, the interviewees see the ‘international actors’ as homogenous.
What follows below is first a deconstruction of Kosovo’s narratives, in which we look
at locals as ‘host’ of their ‘home’, namely Kosovo. The article takes on board the
criticism that Kosovo is too often presented as a battlefield of a dichotomous ethnic
conflict and myth-based hatred. As such, it looks at the narratives of all ethnic groups
living in Kosovo. Second, using local narratives, we deconstruct the international
narrative in which we treat the international missioniser as ‘guest’. In both cases, the
deconstructed narratives will be synthesised by the author’s interpretation.
Kosovo as Historical Justice
As mentioned previously, when deconstructing the local narratives, we treat Kosovo
as the ‘home’ of its peoples. Elsewhere, we have detailed how the EU mission in
Kosovo has altered the notion of ‘home’, as the concepts of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ have
been reversed.2 The mission, being omnipotent in residing and acting, has turned
into ‘host’ and the local people have become ‘guests’. In this article, we re-return
‘home’ to Kosovo’s people and let their ‘home’ deconstruct itself. Above all, ‘home’
in the local narratives in this article is also read as a sense of belonging, dignity and
respect—not only of having a ‘home’ as such, but more importantly being the host
of it. In returning Kosovo as ‘home’ to its people we acknowledge Kosovo as their
historical justice too. The conceptualisation of historical justice will be deconstructed
utilising the works of scholars of nationalism and identity politics, such as Benedict
Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Michael Billig.
Albanians: Kosovo Fetish
In the Albanian narrative, we look at the representation of Kosovo as myth3 in our
interviews,4 anecdotal evidence (Maliqi 2008; Selimi 2008; Heta 2010; Respondent
10 2012, interview, 3 April), literature on Kosovo’s national struggle (Kelmendi
1997, 193; Salihu 2005, 42–44; Luci 2008, 92–93; Maliqi 2010, 53) and media
discourse (television and news portals).5 This is not an attempt to claim a linear
narrative of Kosovo Albanians. Different interest groups may have diverse interests,
values and identities, which in turn diversifies narratives. Nor is it an attempt to
look at ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’ as homogenous and static categories. Needless to
say, these concepts are always contested and dynamic. Yet, the literature on nation-
alism and evidence from field work reveals that when it comes to the paradigmatic
issue—which for societies in the making is the foundation of a state—there is an
overarching consensus on statehood. In this case, there is an overarching consensus
of Kosovo’s statehood—Kosovo as ‘home’. Looking more at the historical past, we
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develop a bias/assumption that ‘independence’ has framed Kosovo’s history for the
past hundred years and to a large extent continues to frame its present as well. In
this narrative, Kosovo is the historical justice of people who have lived in inhumane
conditions as an ethnic group in the Yugoslav federation, while simultaneously the
latter was going through changes of democratic evolution and economic develop-
ment, with the paradoxes of democratic evolution and economic development. It is
the Kosovo entrenched in the national (imagined) memory and a dreamlike project
for making it an independent state. In this narrative Kosovo is both somewhat
religion and identity.
Kosovo’s (remembered) organised struggle for self-determination may be traced
back to 1878 along with other nation-state movements in the region at the start of
the fall of Ottoman Empire (Anderson 2006, 84).6 It had never been a ‘state’ in its
own right, but has always been part of something bigger (the Ottoman Empire,
Yugoslavia etc.). It has never been a ‘home’, rather a part (room, corridor, back
yard) of bigger homes, or mansions. For a long time, the issue of ‘independence’ and
‘statehood’ (building a ‘home’) in Kosovo has been a project of different segments
of society which do not necessarily share an ideological, political and cultural
identity. The project of building a ‘home’, and more importantly being the ‘host’ of
it, has had as its promoter the pacifists of Kosovo’s Democratic League (KDL), who
refused to resort to violence against Serbian troops, maintaining that a Gandhi-like
ideology of resistance and pacifism was the only way through. Yet Kosovo as ‘home’
has also been a project of the guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA)—the insurgent against the Serbian army in 1999. The collective memory and
the current struggle of the nation consider independence as something sacred:
sacred to religious levels characterised by devotion, adoration and, most impor-
tantly, sacrifice. Hobsbawm argues that nationalism is a civic religion that replaces
religion, ‘because of the near pathological character of nationalism, nations, inspire
love, and often profoundly self-sacrifice’ (Hobsbawm 2012, 66). In a similar vein,
Anderson reminds us that while historians, diplomats, politicians and social scien-
tists are quite at ease with the idea of ‘national interest’, for most ordinary people
of whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is interestless. Just for that
reason, it can ask for sacrifices (Anderson 2006, 70).
Kosovo thus represents this ‘home’ that has never been, has never materialised, but
has been dreamt of and fought for. As such it has always been idealised. In Spectres
of Marx, Derrida writes that as soon as there is production, there is fetishism,
idealisation, autonomisation and automatisation, dematerialisation and spectral
incorporation. He adds further that this turns concepts into religion (Derrida 2006,
164–166). The collective memory views an ‘independent Kosovo’ as a perennial
cause; it repeats it throughout the imagined historical events and struggles and
idealises it as sublime, turning it ultimately into a fetish. It becomes a mirage, and
at the same time loses its intrinsic meaning. It is not thought of simply as a ‘home’
to live in and be able to own materially. Rather, it is an ideal, a reparation and above
all, justice. After decades of living in ‘abnormal’ conditions (politically, economi-
cally, socially and psychologically), the very sense of what Kosovo as ‘home’/state
represented for the people lost a number of layers that a ‘normal’ state has for its
own citizens (i.e. taxation, education, pensions, etc.). In time, Kosovo had been
downgraded into this ideology inseminating resistance, pride, sacrifice and a sense
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of collectivity. Most people who saw Kosovo ‘liberated’ in 1999, had a vague or no
memory of a normally functioning state apparatus. The ‘state’ (Serbia/Yugoslavia)
was the enemy and the structure to be feared, resisted and escaped from. The ‘state’
(Kosovo) they were asking for was a restoration of their lost possibility of having a
‘home’ and being acknowledged as ‘hosts’. The fetishism of what the ‘state’ is still
lingers in daily political life after all these years. In the account of their experience
in Kosovo, two UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) officials
wrote that ‘after so many years of life and death, struggling, survival and sacrifice,
the Kosovar voter was not used to ask from the elected politicians to deal with
day-to-day issues like irrigation or waste management’ (King and Mason 2007,
132–138). On a similar note, a senior Kosovar journalist argues that ‘it is difficult to
make that shift now ... to think of a state as a state that is there to simplify and
regulate your life. It is in our subconscious that we don’t deserve liberty as humans
but we have it because something supernatural has happened’ (Respondent 3 2012,
interview, 26 November).
Fetishised, Kosovo becomes the political and social identity of the Albanians. Camp-
bell defines identity as difference, saying that there are no pre-existing foundations
that determine an identity; instead they are constructed through the differences
between inside and outside (Campbell 1998b, 5). Apart from the need to identify
with an independent state as ‘home’, Kosovo is an identity in opposition to the
other; in opposition to Serbia and the Serbs, not only as perpetrators but also in the
obstruction that Serbia makes to the very idea of having an independent Kosovo. In
Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics, Laclau and Zac (1994, 31–34) argue that
people underscore a generally felt need to belong to society, because it is this sense
of belonging that establishes our identity and allows for agency. In societies that are
‘unfinished’ in establishing their ‘home’, the sense of belonging and identifying
with one’s country is even higher. For instance, toponyms such as ‘Kurdistan’,
‘Catalonia’ or ‘Quebec’ become a common vernacular in the identity of the respec-
tive groups. Throughout the Yugoslav period, for instance, ordinary people from
Kosovo would refuse to say ‘I come from Yugoslavia’, notwithstanding that it would
not arbitrarily imply any sort of ethnic attribution. The vast majority would have
preferred to respond ‘I am from Kosovo’, as to denote the fact that they did not see
themselves as part of the political state they lived in. Rather, they saw themselves
and hence wanted to be acknowledged as people, ‘hosts’, of this imagined ‘home’.
Currently, it is rather common to see Kosovars at conferences or international
meetings stating that ‘I come from the Republic of Kosovo’. This, however, should
not be seen as a mere identification with a ‘republic’ in a material way. ‘Kosova
Republikë’ (Republic of Kosovo) was a common illegal graffiti slogan in the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s, when Kosovo’s autonomy had been revoked and
it implies on-going struggle. Nowadays, because it is ‘unfinished’, Kosovo is not a
‘home’ yet. As such, it is claimed by Kosovo Albanians as a historical right after the
catharsis; as a remedy for every right they feel was taken away from them, and for
all the injustices they perceive themselves to have lived through.
The Serbs: Kosovo and the Injustice of International Aggression
In the Serbian discourse, the events of 1999 are not known as a war between
Serbia’s government and the Albanian majority. In the interviews with Serbian
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respondents (Respondent 5 2012, interview, 23 November; Respondent 6 2013,
interview, 16 October; Respondent 2 2013, interview, 16 October), in the Serbian
media (Beta 2011) and Serbian school books (Nikolic 2005, 109; Djuric 2007, 37),
the events of 1999 are referred to as ‘NATO aggression’, which was then followed
by the internationalisation of Kosovo’s case. The removal of Serbian forces from
Kosovo and the installation of international structures is also seen as a Western
project for creating an Albanian Kosovo while belittling the Serbs. This in turn
defines the historical injustice.
In this narrative Kosovo, is also unfinished in the ‘home’ and identity status. Whose
‘home’ is it now that it is not part of Serbia anymore? What is its identity, and more
importantly how does the new situation affect the identity of local Serbs? These
questions are not merely rhetorical, considering how porous the concept of ‘home’
is in the case of Kosovo. For instance, since the end of the war, Kosovo Serbs have
been living in three different political entities/contexts/‘homes’ at the same time,
depending on in which area they were located. Therefore, the Serbs in south-east
Kosovo were living under the ‘Albanian system’ and later in ‘independent’ Kosovo;
the Serbs in the south and Gracanica have been living in ‘Kosovo under
UNSC1244’.7 The Serbs in the north (North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavic and
Zvecan) have been living in ‘Serbia’. Because there has not been a uniform legal
system of governing and the ‘borders’ (political and administrative) were porous,
one could basically ‘choose’ under which authority to live. The narratives of the
Serbs should be viewed in this shifting context.
The city of Mitrovica—divided at the bridge over the Ibar River between an
Albanian part in the south and a Serbian part in the north—marks the ‘border’
between the four ethnically Serbian municipalities and the rest of Kosovo. Derrida
argues that boundary (as in border) defines the line where one thing ends and
another begins, and as much as it is about identification, it is about exclusion
(Derrida 2003b, 72). For Derrida, reflecting critically on the nature of limits and
boundaries transforms our well-established way of thinking about identity as a
homogenous and self-enclosed totality. He makes a distinction between what the
Swiss-Italian border in Mont Blanc means in terms of division and what the Berlin
Wall as a border meant. Since 1999, Serbian municipalities in the north have been
outside of the international/local jurisdiction and control. Showing their opposition
to Kosovo’s partitioning from Serbia, they have protested and resisted new estab-
lishments while maintaining ties with Serbia instead. For around 15 years now, the
‘border’ has become more solid, which for Kosovo Albanians has been the greatest
and most dangerous failure of the international community, particularly UNMIK
and EULEX. For UNMIK, any intervention to include the north in ‘Kosovo’s’
jurisdiction was off the table because it would have incited violence from the Serbs
and would have jeopardised the ‘stability’ achieved in Kosovo (Respondent 8 2013,
interview, 4 April) EULEX, on the other hand, cannot take action because they ‘lack
the capabilities to do so and most importantly because any move to do so would
imply that EULEX is supporting Kosovo’s independence and that would outrage the
Serbs’ (Respondent 1 2012, interview, 10 October).
The ‘border’ at the bridge does not only mark the division of Albanians and Serbs
and even Serbs and the ‘others’ of Kosovo. Until 2013, the ‘border’ marked the
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end of the international structures (police, courts, military, etc.), making the
‘northern’ part of Kosovo a grey zone—a fault line between Serbia and Kosovo.
When passing the ‘border’ at Mitrovica’s bridge, one also transcends ‘Kosovo’ and
finds oneself in Serbia. The cars carry Serbian number plates (if they carry any),
mobile phones receive the message ‘Welcome to Serbia’ and one is automatically
connected to Serbian phone companies. Schools, institutions and the like have
the labels of Serbian ministries and institutions. In supermarkets one can only
purchase goods ‘Made in Serbia’ and everything is paid in ‘dinar’—Serbia’s
currency.8
‘North’ is least of all a geographical notion. When passing the ‘border’/bridge, one
also travels in time. The city’s scenery goes back to the socialist/Yugoslav setting
of the 1990s. A state of emergency and ‘securitisation’ is immediately felt as there
are no signs of police or any security structure, and EU officials patrol in bullet-
proof cars and vests. Banal nationalism is omnipresent, with ‘patriotic’ slogans
and Serbian flags found everywhere (Billig 1995, 37). While in a silent war with
the Albanian majority, the Serbs in the north are fierce opponents of the inter-
national presence too. They see the US and the EU/EULEX—but not so much the
UN—as structures which are there to make Kosovo an independent state in
which the Serbs are side-lined by the Albanian majority. In the north, the
feeling of being abandoned/betrayed by Serbia itself has increased, since nego-
tiations started between Belgrade and Pristina.9 Posters of Serbia’s and Kosovo’s
prime ministers shaking hands in EU High Representative Catherine Ashton’s
office are omnipresent in the city, accompanied by the caption ‘We will never
forget’. ‘For 15 years, I protest here against the Pristina’s secessionism. And
now what? Dacic goes to Brussels and kisses with Thaçi and Ashton’, argues
a local taxi driver in North Mitrovica (Respondent 2 2013, interview, 16
October)10
For Serbs in Gracanica and those in other parts of Kosovo, the situation is slightly
different. Although they retain the dissatisfaction with the fact that Kosovo is in the
process of (eventually) becoming a fully-fledged independent state—an Albanian-
hosted ‘home’—most of them are already part of Kosovo’s institutions and struc-
tures and/or they work with the international structures and organisations in
Kosovo. They feel that the post-1999 period is all about the Albanians, but because
Kosovo has to appear ‘multi-ethnic’ and ‘tolerant’ abroad, the international struc-
tures want to keep the Serbs to make that point. ‘We (the Serbs) are merely a
decoration here. Brussels and Washington need us here so that they can say that
Kosovo is the country of everyone. And we all know that is not true. Least of all it
is of the Serbs. And it’s not of the Albanians either. The West lures the Albanians
with power just to make its agenda happen’, argues a local Serb in Gracˇanica
working with NGOs (Respondent 5 2012, interview, 23 November). He explains
that Kosovo Serbs are not on the agenda of any of the ‘stakeholders’ who have
power over Kosovo. ‘The EU is negotiating with Dacˇic´ and Thaçi on Kosovo’s
future, but our interests—interests of Kosovo Serbs—are not represented. Serbia is
trying to buy its own way to the EU; Kosovo is buying its independence and the EU
is showing that they deserved the Nobel Prize’ (Respondent 5 2012, interview, 23
November).
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Multi-ethnic Kosovo: The Insignificant ‘Others’
The literature on Kosovo and developments of the late 1990s is entrenched in
explaining the developments as a story of two characters (the Albanians and the
Serbs) and one single topic—the Balkan, tribal-like eruption of violence, rooted in
myths and a historical past. Other minorities (ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.) hardly
trigger even a marginal debate. This approach has not only further mystified the
whole debate of what exactly happened during the war but it has also influenced
policy choices on how to deal with it. When engaging with deconstruction, Derrida
takes what is marginal and makes it central to the debate and discussion. A similar
reading can be given to the question of the ‘visibility’ of ‘other’ ethnic minorities.
If they are marginalised in the picture and are treated as a liminal anomaly, we must
at least ask why. We maintain that what happened during and after the war is a
struggle for power and a fight for survival, accommodation, dominance and power
of all Kosovo’s major and marginal groups: Albanians, Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks,
Turks, Croats, Ashkali, etc. Being smaller in number or structurally detached from
high politics, these minorities have remained outside of the dichotomous debate, the
Albanians or the Serbs. In the political discourse of the international community,
minority politics, human rights, or even the whole concept of cultural heritage have
been downgraded as ‘rights’ to accommodate the Serbian minority in the new
settlement. The Ahtisaari Plan is entirely based on the logic of granting asymmet-
rical power to the Serbs (United Nations Security Council 2007, 3–18). The values
of ‘communities’ and minorities appear to be not that important when it comes to
other, non-Serb minorities. Looking at media reports and documentaries on other
minorities in Kosovo, it is clear that the focus on ‘politically more important’
minorities is not present only in legislation.
The Roma, for instance, who in the eyes of the Albanians are seen as collaborators
of the Serbs during the war, are ‘shifted’ into the domain of the Serbs.11 As far as the
international project is concerned, the discourse about the need to accommodate
the Serbs does not apply to the Roma. Throughout the period 1999–2010, Roma
were internally displaced by UNMIK to what was to be a temporary camp near
Plemetin. For ten years, human rights organisations have highlighted how this
camp is located near industrial zones, and contaminated with lead and other forms
of toxic waste (Life in Kosovo Show 2009). Medical evidence has shown that most
Roma children born in the camp carry toxic substances in their blood. In this case,
the inhumane conditions of Roma were not hampering the ‘multi-ethnic’ image of
Kosovo as much as was, for instance, the inability of Serbs and Albanians to sell
their home-grown vegetables at a joint market. After all, the Roma scandal was a
violation of human rights principles (strictly speaking) but it did not constitute a
violation of ‘community rights’, ‘opportunities for the communities’ or the ‘multi-ethnic’
image of Kosovo. This not only displays the utterly discriminatory logic of attribu-
tion but most of all it detaches the concept of minority rights from the basic human
rights concept, ultimately displaying the pervertibility of ‘multi-ethnicity’.
Rrahmon Stollaku, a local Roma from Fushë-Kosova, who was initially employed
at the Ministry for Communities and the Return, explains how the issues of Roma,
Ashkali and Egyptians are simply not seen as part of the problem/solution. ‘There
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is a 10% quota for employing non-Albanian communities in public institutions. But
it has been obvious throughout all these years that the Serbian group is always
favoured, for political reasons. I mean (and you know it too), nobody will be
shocked if there is an open discrimination towards a Roma, but if that happens
against a Serb, all international media will be alarmed’ (Life in Kosovo Show 2012).
Gadime is a town where the Ashkali community is quite large in number. Shpejtim
Limani, a local from this town argues that although the Ashkali minority is the
second-largest group (after the Albanians), the Serbs are given priority in employ-
ment and education (Life in Kosovo Show 2012).
Kosovo’s Turks did not openly ‘favour’ any particular side during the war, but were
nonetheless seen as allies of the Albanians. Concentrated largely in Prizren and
eastern Kosovo, they were more organised to benefit in the post-war period with
the Albanians in power. They have developed further ties with Turkey and profited
from decentralisation extending their cultural and linguistic rights. As with other
ethnic minorities, a quota is set for their representation in public institutions,
although this in no way represents their accommodation in society at large.
Bosniaks and Croats have a rather hybrid post-war identification. While during the
war they were seen as opponents of the Serbs due to the previous wars in their
mother states, they were not as well accommodated in the aftermath, due to
linguistic and cultural proximity to the Serbs.12 Along with the Roma, they remain
not only on the margins of the Serbo-Albanian struggle but also of the international
project.
We term these groups the insignificant ‘others’ because we witness the autoimmunity
of multi-ethnicity, in which it tries to exist by consciously marginalising ‘others’. In
the case of Roma, Turks, Bosniaks and Ashkali, Kosovo somehow tries to become
multi-ethnic by side-lining them. It is multi-ethnic while the discourse mentions the
Serbians as a marked category; the rest are simply ‘others’. They are insignificant not
only by being marginalised in the discourse but above all by being a group of
‘others’, with no name or agency. Therefore, it becomes imperative to ask how a
minority group or, in the EU’s language ‘a community’ is defined. Or maybe the
question should be asked, who and for whom the picture of Kosovo as a home of ‘all
communities’ is important? The concept of ‘multi-ethnicity’ and ‘home of all commu-
nities’ implies importance, relevance and equality. Yet certain groups appear to be
more important and more relevant for the multi-ethnic picture. Or as Orwell put it,
some animals are more equal than others.
Kosovo Project: From UNMIKISTAN
to EULEKSPERIMENT
As we have returned Kosovo as ‘home’ to its people/‘host’, we have in turn
repositioned the missionisers to the ‘guest’ status. To deconstruct their narrative,
aside from our interviews, we will make use of the visual communication modes of
the international structures, such as billboards, leaflets, slogans, etc. In looking at
them as text, we deconstruct them with the local narratives.
UNMIK’s period was characterised by the logic of ‘ “stability” above all’ (King and
Mason 2007, 65–67). Stability was defined in terms of inter-ethnic relations
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(Musliu 2010, 42–44). Lack of physical violence between Serbs and Albanians
marked ‘stability’ and any physical confrontation between the two was making the
situation ‘unstable’. All other issues were subordinate to the principle of ‘stability’.
This was true even in cases where basic democratic principles had to be violated,
such as was the case with Prishtina-based newspaper Dita in 2000. After reporting
that a suspected Serb, who had been involved in the war against the Albanians, was
employed by UNMIK, the head of UNMIK at that time in 2000, Bernard Kouchner,
passed a controversial regulation in ‘prohibiting media to incite violence’ and the
newspaper was closed (King and Mason 2007, 107–120). The regulation stated that
‘owners, operators, publishers and editors shall refrain from publishing personal
details of any person, including name, address or place of work, if the publication
of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety or security of any such
person through vigilante violence or otherwise’ (UNMIK/REG/2000/37, 5). Failure
to comply with the rules would result in the ‘seizure of equipment and/or printed
material; and suspension or close down of operations’ (UNMIK/REG/2000/37,
6–7). The regulation had further implications in prohibiting other media from
engaging with investigative journalism and/or openly criticising the international
administration (Hysa 2004, 97–105). Explaining how democracy is autoimmune,
Bulley argues that ‘democracy has always had this quasi suicidal possibility with
itself—it may commit suicide (impose authoritarian rule and end democracy) to
prevent its murder (the democratic end to democracy)’ (Bulley 2009, 26). The aim
to maintain ‘stability’ was utterly undemocratic, not only in practice but also in
content. Practices like these—where the locals were lectured about democracy
while the mission was not adhering to basic democratic principles itself—led to
frustration and the coining of the term ‘UNMIKISTAN’ (King and Mason 2007, 44).
The ending ‘stan’ is Farsi for land, widely used in other Middle-Eastern languages.
For instance, ‘Afghanistan’ means ‘the land of the Afghans’. That in turn means
that Afghanistan is not the land of anybody else. It is not the land of Algerians, for
instance. By the same token, UNMIKISTAN not only denotes Kosovo as ‘the land of
UNMIK’ but at the same time it tells us that this is not ‘the land’ of somebody else.
It appropriates it. UNMIK had an unprecedented and all-encompassing mandate,
being in charge of the executive, legislative and judicial functions with which it
practically ‘appropriated’ Kosovo. Locals were using the term to indicate that the
mission had turned Kosovo into a corrupt/oligarchic/poor/former Soviet-like
republic, where debate, power and decision-making rested in a higher nomencla-
ture, detached from its population.
During the EU mission ‘ “multi-ethnicity”, “rule of law” and “European values” above
all’ became omnipresent. UNMIK and EULEX are perceived in a linear fashion in
the missions’ trajectory in Kosovo. This ‘linearity’ stretches out also towards the
missions’ performance. Each of the missions and their structures has tried its best
‘models’ in promoting democracy in Kosovo. Yet, this has created a sense as of
living in a laboratory where local Kosovars are used as units of analysis in
the subsequent experimentation process. However, when it comes to EULEX, the
criticism is fiercer, firstly because expectations were much higher than what the
mission seems to be able to deliver, and secondly, because it was seen as an
opportunity to break the ‘inefficient’ trajectory of UNMIK. For instance, EULEX
took on UNMIK’s practice of impunity of high-level officials as a commitment for its
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rule-of-law program. However, despite the action taken in dramatic scenes, resem-
bling ‘FBI’ action flicks, this has remained largely a publicity campaign, as no one
in high levels of power was ever judged Kalaja 2012. The high-profile accused were
released on grounds of lack of evidence, recalled to court again and released.
Actions like these have lowered the popularity of the mission. The frustration of the
locals with what they see to be EULEX’s inability to live up to its mandate is coined
‘EULEKSPERIMENT’—graffiti omnipresent in Prishtina. ‘EULEKS’ is the Albanian
and Serbian pronunciation of EULEX, while the bold ‘KS’ letters are commonly
used as a code for ‘Kosovo’. Interestingly EULEKSPERIMENT is not only popular
amongst the locals. Several EULEX officials have used the term too.
‘EULEKSPERIMENT indeed! A lot of what we do in Kosovo is experimental. This is
the first mission of the sort and we are trying to find our way. Some of the
experiments are successful, others less successful’ (Respondent 9 2013, interview,
10 October).
The frustration, however, is not only with the experiment of ‘finding’ the way to
acting strategically, but also with the very way EULEX ‘finds’ its way to commu-
nicate with the locals. While experimenting with the mission, they are also experi-
menting with locals too, argues a local security studies scholar. ‘The recent EULEX
advertisements have on their background the theme song of the movie Mission
Impossible’ (Respondent 4 2012, interview, 21 November). It is rather unclear
though, whether fighting corruption is impossible for EULEX itself or whether it is
impossible to fight corruption in Kosovo. As part of its communication campaign,
EULEX distributed flyers with the sentence ‘EULEX has done nothing to fight
corruption and serious crime ... More than 200 people and counting’, to cynically
respond to local criticism. A local legal expert and journalist, argues that on top of
everything, EULEX seems to be failing in its own public relations too. ‘One cannot
brag about procedural acts. You claim “success” on closed cases and verdicts’
(Respondent 7 2012, interview, 16 October).
Conclusion: ‘Unfinished’
In this article, we have tried to ‘give’ Kosovo back as ‘home’ to its own people and
by reinstating their ‘host’ status we have acknowledged their narrative as a story of
their ‘home’. Derrida’s concept of ‘undecidability’—as in the impossibility of attrib-
uting something with certainty—is nowhere so organically linked as in the case of
Kosovo (Derrida 1992, 24–26). Kosovo as ‘home’ and its narratives deconstruct
themselves ceaselessly and turn it in the exact ‘undecidabilitiy’. It is both the point of
division and commonality of all narratives. Both international and local narratives
are always already both subject and object, yet fully neither at the same time. They
exist and are destroyed by their own. Their subjectivity therefore lies in their
autoimmunity, which makes them intrinsically undecidable. Their autoimmune sub-
jectivity is inherently undecidable. They themselves are incapable of accepting
‘ownership’ and this reveals their own instability.
On the one hand, all the narratives claiming Kosovo, see the latter as ‘home’. At the
same time, it is not fully ‘home’ of any of the narratives. As such, it cannot be
‘home’. The impossibility of identifying Kosovo within narratives also makes it an
‘undecidable’. The difficulty lies in identifying it as ‘home’, and identifying the
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‘host(s)’ and the ‘guest(s)’. Here, Kosovo is a battleground of competing/struggling
stories—stories of ‘host(s)’ and ‘guest(s)’. Each of them struggles for supremacy and
legitimacy. At the same time, each of them struggles for survival. The Albanian
narrative seeks legitimacy as justice after the catharsis, seeks supremacy as the right
of the ‘victim’ and survival to build and own a ‘home’ (as in a sovereign state). The
Serbian narrative seeks legitimacy for the ‘home’ they have had removed and
asserts that they are equally a victim of a broader project of intervention. Narratives
of the Roma, Turks and Bosniaks struggle primarily with survival in a dichotomous
battleground between the Serbs and the Albanians but also as narratives on their
own. Lastly, the international narrative seeks legitimacy in Kosovo as its successful
project, a success story of interventions and missions—despite contestation from
locals. Every narrative which claims it, ‘deserves’ it and at the same time each of
them is contested, implausible and weak. That is, each of them both ‘own’ it and at
the same time are alien to its ‘owning’.
On the other hand, Kosovo is also an arena of shared/common narratives. Bulley
comments that ‘home is where the ethics are’ (Bulley 2010, 46). Along the same
lines, Kosovo is ‘home’ to all narratives that trace in it their stories, histories,
memories, values and also ethics. It is a point of commonality primarily for the two
dichotomous narratives, seen as binary opposites or mutually exclusive stories. The
Serbs and the Albanians have reached a historical point in their claims on Kosovo,
where they share Kosovo as a state beyond ‘home’ (beyond sovereignty). For the
Serbs, Kosovo as their previous ‘home’ is beyond remedy, for the Albanians Kosovo
as their new/legitimate ‘home’ is beyond reach. Thus, it is ‘home’ of both and none
at the same time. It is not present in either way. Above all, all narratives presented
in this article share the ‘Kosovo to come’—a Kosovo that is not here, not present.
Talking about democracy to come, Derrida argues that ‘for democracy remains to
come, not only it will remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and
future, but belonging to the time of the promise’ (Derrida 2003a, 89–94). So it is
with Kosovo. In all of the narratives, it exists only as a promise. It is a promise to
happen in the future. As for now, it is only possible as impossible. Its impossibility
is the condition of its possibility. As such, it is defined as the very ideal of Kosovo,
by the lack of its presence. It inscribes support or adherence to believe in it. ‘I
believe in it, I promise, I am in on the promise and in messianic waiting’ (Derrida
2003a, 91). Finally, Kosovo as ‘home’ is hospitable to all narratives, just as much as
it is hostile. Derrida explained this as hostipility, to reveal the way hospitality and
hostility are both undecidable concepts (Derrida 2002, 356).
What does this mean then for the concept of ‘home’ and its position towards
intervention? What about the concept of mission? Even though the concept of
‘home’ offers both the possibility to welcome the other and be hospitable, it incites
brutal responses towards others in the name of protecting ‘home’; it should be
defended for the very notion of a desire to have a ‘home’. On similar grounds,
Derrida has defended the ‘home’ as ‘the unconditional desire, which is impossible
to renounce and should not be renounced, for without home, there is no door nor
any hospitality’ (Derrida 2002, 350–356). Thus, the very existence of it makes the
welcoming of the other and more broadly ‘hospitality’ possible. We do not have to
choose or give up options or narratives; rather, we can engage deeper with rene-
gotiating ‘home’ and ethics as ‘home’ and intervention as ‘ethics’.
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Notes
1. Securitisation here does not refer to ‘securitisation’ in the international relations sense, as a concept
connected with the Copenhagen School. It is instead used as a term to portray a situation in which
a country/society still considers itself vulnerable, threatened (physically or otherwise) by an external
agent, and this in turn leads to a polarisation/heightened inner debate over national interests,
national security, remembrance, nationalism, etc.
2. Musliu and Orbie 2014.
3. Considering that ‘myth’ and ‘mythologies’ are rather common references in writings on the history
and politics of the Balkans, it is important to clarify that myth in this case does not imply anything to
do with the ‘truthfulness’ of stories. Rather, it is more a term to indicate the sacredness of Kosovo.
4. 35 interviews were conducted throughout 2012–2013 in locations around Kosovo.
5. The following online newspapers and portals were analysed: Koha; GazetaExpress; and Telegrafi.
6. The word ‘remembered’ is used because rather than being an event as such, it describes more a social
imaginary, which for Anderson is ‘not as a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making sense
of, the practices of society ... and it presents the ways in which people imagine their social existence,
how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations
that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these
expectations’.
7. Kosovo’s official denomination while under UNMIK.
8. Kosovo has used the euro as its currency since January 2002.
9. The article makes use of ‘Pristina’ as an internationally recognized name for the city. In Albanian the
city is written as ‘Pristina’, whereas in Serbian ‘Pristina’. The choice made on the article does not hold
an ethnic bias.
10. Kosovo’s PM, Hashim Thaçi, former leader of the KLA, has been on Serbia’s black list for almost 20
years. Serbia’s PM, Ivica Dacic was the spokesperson of Slobodan Milosevic in 1992.
11. Along with the Serbian population, 50,000 Roma fled Albanian-inhabited cities after the war.
12. It is essential to mention that in the first years after the war, speaking in Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian
was as dangerous as being an Albanian during the war. Valentin Krumov, a Bulgarian UN official was
shot in Prishtina in 1999 because he had spoken Serbian. The aftermath of the war was a state of
emergency for people seeking revenge. Prishtina was going through a socio-urban challenge with a
massive migration of families from different cities and/or areas. For many people, the first and only
contact with hearing Serbian was the war experience.
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